Sri Lanka - India's Vietnam

History stands as witness that hardly ever has an invading army been successful in achieving its aim without resulting in the utter ruin of the land. When you look at successful invasions from the Mongols hordes to the surreptitious seizure of India by the British to the D-Day landings in France, you see a common trend; either the invading force completely destroys the occupied land or enjoys the support of the local populace either by choice or coercion. Anytime in history when an invading force has invaded without the intention of complete destruction and doesn't enjoy the the support from the locals, it hasn't ended well for them. Despite the destruction caused during the US-Vietnam conflict, the US never wanted to obliterate Vietnam. Rather they wanted to extend their sphere of influence in Asia to combat the Soviets by turning Vietnam into another South Korea. While your objective of invading a country may be for the greater good of the region or for achieving a strategic aim, but if you are seen as an unwelcome invader and if you don't put a country to the sword and don't enjoy support of the local population, then your long term objectives of total control are doomed. The British and the Soviets learned it in Afghanistan, the French & Americans in Vietnam and Indians in Sri Lanka.

Prelude to the conflict

Sri Lanka lies only 60km from Tamil Nadu, one the southernmost state of India. Historically, both countries have enjoyed a long association dating back to the time of the Ramayana. From Valmiki's time to the present date, both countries have been associated through the silk route, language and culture. Infact one of the main demographic groups in Sri Lanka are the Tamils, who share a common lineage to the Indian Tamils. Both countries gained their independence from the British during the same time; India in 1947 & Ceylon or erstwhile Sri Lanka in 1948 and both are ardent cricket lovers. But here is where the similarities end. While post independence India decided to sculpt its future in a more inclusive and diverse way, Sri Lanka imposed the writ of the majority Sinhalese on the minority Tamil population. While the seeds of discord between the two groups were sown in early 1900s by the British administration, post independence the Tamil population was almost reduced to second class citizens. They were not granted citizenship (all Indian Tamils were granted citizenship in 2003 - 55 years after independence), Sinhalese was recognized as the sole official language of the country and the Indian, Sri Lankan & Moors Tamils were gradually forced out of government services. The banning of Tamil language media & state sponsored colonization of agricultural land in favor of Sinhalese peasants led to calls of an independent state or the Tamil Eelam. The writing was on the wall. What followed was a highly protracted & costly 25 year long civil war that would dominate Sri Lankan politics, society and foreign perception for years to follow.

Pawns & Kings

The Sri Lankan Civil War threw up a host of characters that would dominate the sub continent in various ways. The Sri Lankan government was dominated by their long serving President J R Jayewardene & later by Ranasinghe Premadasa (who was assassinated in 1993) none of whom enjoyed good relations with India & Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. This was due to a variety of reasons.

During the rise of Tamil insurgents, RAW & Indian special forces trained cadres from the LTTE and other affiliated groups and provided monetary support due to appeasement & backlash of the Tamil population of India and in response to the violent persecution of the Sri Lankan Tamils. LTTE's entire leadership was trained in various camps across Tamil Nadu and also at Chakratra, the home of the elusive Special Group (some instructors ended up fighting their erstwhile students). The other reason was the perceived view of India being the big brother in the region. India was fresh off the victory in Siachen and Operation Brasstacks was just around the corner. In 1988, the 50 Para Brigade would lead successful liberation operation in Maldives as well. As the dominant powerhouse of the region, India wished to flex its prowess and increase its geopolitical sphere of influence. They were vary of the potential threat to India's territorial integrity due to calls of the Tamil Eelam comprising the whole of the Tamil population in India & Sri Lanka and the possible exploitation of the situation by a foreign and hostile power like Pakistan or China.

This was promptly viewed with suspicion by the SL government and welcomed by the insurgents who accepted the military training with open arms. Without this training and support it is unlikely that they would have been able to prolong their insurgency. The only thing lacking here was a concrete foreign policy. For far too long India's foreign policy was dictated by local popular demands and flimsy political maneuvering. This is what would ultimately lead to the Indian effort shifting from support to outright hostilities with the LTTE. The distrust between the Sri Lankan government and the Indian government was further cemented with the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 which forced Sri Lanka to pull back its troops from the north and hand over effective control and disarmament of LTTE to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

While there were plenty of insurgents groups, the LTTE or the Tamil Tigers were the most recognized insurgents groups which took on the Sri Lankan government and the Indian Army and led the insurgency for 25 years. Within a few years LTTE had managed to eliminate or integrate all the other insurgent groups. Those who were not eliminated chose to join voluntarily after witnessing LTTE's violent tendencies. LTTE quickly established itself as an extremely ruthless and capable force. Its fighters were highly motivated akin to the modern day Fedayeen. It regularly plundered the dead and resorted to brutal tactics in order to send a message. It had a military, intelligence and a political wing along with fledgling Airforce and Navy all led by Velupillai Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran was a very effective leader who learnt to play all sides to further his agenda. He used the Indians initially to provide the nucleus of the LTTE through support and training by manipulating the Tamil vote bank and politicians; he used the Sri Lankan government to aid in the eventual departure of the IPKF capitalizing on the anti Indian sentiment and he elicited the support of the local population even when it was hard to differentiate between the atrocities of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Furthermore he garnered funds through Tamil support groups abroad and through a brutal policy of extortion, taxes, drug trafficking and arms brokerage. In the entirety of the conflict Prabhakaran caught the eye of all and managed to outshine Presidents and Prime Ministers, two of whom he eventually had killed.

Uneasy Peace

In the 1980's the situation in Sri Lanka was grim. Militant action was intensifying and the 'Four-Four-Two' incident where 13 commandos of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) were ambushed and killed sparked the Black July riots which left nearly 3000+ Tamils dead. LTTE intensified its campaign and it led to a series of campaigns which left scores dead. In 1987, the SLA launched an all out attack on the Jaffna Peninsula using ground troops and air support including gunships and ground attack aircrafts. It created yet another humanitarian crisis unprecedented in the sub continent in years. With large scale support from the Indian Tamil population and the increased influence of Pakistan in Sri Lankan affairs, PM Rajiv Gandhi sent in unarmed Navy ships to render aid. This was turned around by the Sri Lankan Navy. With Indian offers of peace negotiations rebuffed, the Indian Airforce was ordered in a show of force to organize Operation Poomalai under which 5 AN-32 transport aircraft along with fighter support of 4 Mirage-2000 airdropped 25 tons of aid to the besieged town of Jaffna. Under overwhelming military might the Sri Lankan government agreed to stop the siege, sign the Indo-Sri Lanka accords and allow the introduction of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to disarm the Tamil Tigers. The LTTE was not party to the accord and there was a trust deficit amongst all parties. LTTE feared that should the IPKF withdraw the the disarmed LTTE would face the SLA's onslaught. The die was cast.

IPKF - Caught in the Storm

Right from the start IPKF's role was ambiguous. Initially it went as a benign peacekeeping force akin to the role

Indian Army played at various UN Peacekeeping missions. It was there to enforce the accords, disarm the LTTE and ensure law and order in the north of Sri Lanka. It went with the preparation of aid to civil authority. But the IPKF's mandate was ever changing and it soon found it embroiled in combat against a willy and tough opponent. According to the accords, all surrendered LTTE terrorist were supposed to be handed over the SLA. Fearing torture at the hands of the SLA, the 17 LTTE leaders decided to consume cyanide capsules and committed suicide. The next day LTTE waylaid and ambushed a routine logistic Para commando patrol and in classic example of LTTE

terror tactics put tires over them and burnt them. This would be the spark that changed IPKF's role to open hostilities with the LTTE and led to nearly 2 years of open conflict.

The overnight change showcased the lack of preparation required for foreign interventions. The IPKF had to rely on tourist maps, poor local intelligence and a soon to be hostile population that would actively aid and collude with the LTTE. There was little artillery support. Units were plucked from the mainland and landed at Sri Lanka. Poorly prepared and equipped, with a flimsy political mandate, the IPKF learned some tough lessons in the jungles of Sri Lanka. But it adapted. and Counter Insurgency campaigns was instituted to root out the insurgents

Operation Pawan

IPKF under the command of the command of Lt Gen Depinder Singh decided to secure the Jaffna Peninsula, something which had eluded the SLA. The homeground of the LTTE was of high importance. On the 9th & 10th Oct 1987, IPKF attacked and captured LTTE's radio station and printing press and cause damage to their infrastructure. However the real strength of the LTTE came to fore during the infamous Jaffna University helidrop.

The Jaffna University helidrop an ambitious plan based on intelligence reports that Prabhakaran and various senior leaders of LTTE were going to be present at the Jaffna University campus. The capture or elimination of LTTE's leadership would have shortened the war. The only problem in this otherwise sound plan was that the information was fed by LTTE in a misinformation campaign. Advance knowledge of the landing ground and timing of the operation allowed LTTE to turn the campus into a kill zone with overlapping machine gun & sniper fire focused on the LZ. The first wave comprising of 40 Para Commandos of 10 Para SF were met with heavy automatic fire from the campus. The IAF MI-8s were able to drop only 3 loads of paras and 30 men from the 13th Sikh Li instead of the original 120. Deciding to stick to the mission the paras managed to leave the LZ and hunt LTTS"s leadership. The Sikh Li platoon was soon isolated and slowly picked out by LTTE snipers. The paras were soon themselves waylaid and had to fortify themselves in a couple of houses at day break. They were only extracted in a daring operation led by the CO of 10 Para Lt Col Dalvir Singh and tank commander Maj Anil Kaul. The paras suffered 6 casualties in the operation and the rescue operation cost the life of the CO and multiple officers of 4/5 GR among other officers and soldiers lost. As for the Sikh Li platoon, they put up a valiant yet doomed fight. Journalists who visited the ambush spot noted ankle deep shells all around. 29 of the 30 Sikh Li soldiers were killed including the company commander Maj Birendra Singh and 1 soldier was taken prisoner. LTTE piled their bodies unceremoniously, poured petrol over them and burnt them. So ended the Jaffna helidrop mission. A saga of bravery mired with intelligence failure against an unexpectedly sophisticated enemy.

The Jaffna helidrop only strengthened IPKF's resolve to root out LTTE from its urban centers. It was tough going. Snipers armed with telescopic sights perched high up on palm trees would pick off officers, leaders and signalmen a skill taught by Indian SF instructors. Another arsenal in their pocket was the proficiency at using Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs. They could convert banal items into powerful IEDs which would kill or maim Indian troops. Simple plastic soap dishes would be made into homemade IED alongside heavier explosives which could blow up an armored BMP infantry fighting vehicle where in one instance 72nd Infantry Brigade lost its 2iC Col DS Saraon. IED would be a massive problem for the IPKF till the very end. They were employed ruthlessly and with military proficiency. One previously unseen thing for the Indian Military was the use of child soldiers in combat and suicide bombers. Plus anybody could be an insurgent. They would fire on the soldiers and blend into the crowd. These factors coupled with ruthless guerilla tactics employed by the LTTE would make them a strong opponent in battle.

The rush to reach Jaffna was brutal but it was accomplished at the end. Painstakingly, the 5 brigades of IPKF made to it Jaffna. The only time the imposing Mi-25 attack helicopter gunships were used was during the attack on Chavakachcheri. Only 32 rockets were fired but as a consequence 18th Infantry brigade only suffered 3 casualties.

Ultimately by 23rd October the LTTE was driven out of urban centers methodically often at the cost of high casualties due to political & humanitarian compulsions of not using air power and artillery. Though true to their nature LTTE adapted and continued their campaign from the jungles. Operation Pawan succeeded in its broad terms however the threat of the LTTE persisted. A bitter counterinsurgency war would be fought in the jungles of North Sri Lanka for the next 2 years. For the Indian troops the battle was a sort of preparation for the Kashmir insurgency with the best practices and lessons learned being employed there. The lack of sufficient on ground intelligence would be the achilles heal for the IPKF. The ultimate cost of the operations in Sri Lanka would claim the lives of nearly 1287 soldiers killed and nearly 6000 wounded. Sri Lanka would prove to a bitter warzone for the rest of the time that the IPKF was stationed there. Deteriorating relations between the Indian & Sri Lankan government would lead to ultimately the LTTE colluding with the Sri Lankan government to rearm using weapons procured by the SL government to renew the fighting against the IPKF. Despite its unpopularity in Sri Lanka and the growing casualties, Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw the IPKF. When he lost the 1989 elections, his successor VP Singh decided to withdraw the IPKF. On 24th March 1990, the last Indian troops left Sri Lanka, 3 years after they were sent to a foreign land for 'just a few weeks'.

A Forgotten Force

Hindsight is always 20-20. Today political commenters very easily write off the Indian Intervention as a failed military adventurism, but for the troops who served there, the political considerations were a far off thing. There are several lessons from Sri Lanka that shaped India's foreign policy and Indian Army's future operations. Often fighting an unknown and dogged enemy, the soldiers of IPKF suffered more or less from the same political cluelessness that the American GIs did in Vietnam. Observers of India's foreign policy today will probably be aware of the old policy or rather the lack of one during the days of the IPKF. It was reactive and would change on a whim. That's something that has evolved for the better now. Today India's foreign policy is more proactive and aligns with India's interest first. From a military point, Sri Lanka would dictate India's counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine. The lessons learned in Sri Lanka would guide the military's response when the Kashmir Insurgency took off. Most of the Junior Leadership that fought on the island would lead the response against the Pak sponsored terrorist in the valley. The various tactics used by the IPKF and by the LTTE would dictate future conflicts fought by the Indians. Another lesson was the use of the Special Forces in counter insurgency operations. Sri Lanka saw the introduction of the Marine Commandos (now MARCOS) who's operation at the Jaffna & Tricomalee harbor helped secure it from the LTTE. All the 3 commando battalions of the army (9th, 10th and 1st Parachute Regiment) fought in Sri Lanka. While they did suffer heavy casualties, the tactics gained from Sri Lanka were employed with ruthless efficiency in Kashmir. While there were military successes, the intended objective was not realized. LTTE was pushed out of population centers only physically but not in spirt. It would take a mammoth effort from the SLA in 2009 on a war footing to finally defeat the LTTE. The international condemnation, criticism on the excesses committed and the huge civilian casualty count stands as a cautionary tale for what it costs to root out insurgency. This was something that the IPKF wasn't prepared to do. From Malay to Sri Lanka, history stands as a testament. All the successful counterinsurgencies quelled across the world have had one common thread - excessive use of violence, a doctrine of fear and a commitment to do stoop to the level of the person fighting you. IPKF for all its faults, criticisms and allegations, maintained the ethos of the army and on a broad level fought a clean war if such a thing was possible in the jungles of Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka would dominate the headlines after the pullout of the IPKF. Over the next few years the relations between India and Sri Lanka would continue to deteriorate. What would have happened if Rajiv Gandhi came back to power in 1991 is something that would remain a What If? On 21st May 1991, during a political rally, the former PM Rajiv Gandhi would be assassinated by being blown up by a suicide bomber. And with him died the idea of the IPKF. Now remembered only by the veterans or by political commentators during a one off debate on IPKF, the bitter battles fought by the IPKF still resonate loudly in the annals of military history. But for many, Sri Lanka would become India's Vietnam.